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The applicability of the common law in an 
industrial relations context (with special 
reference to industrial action): a comment 
Martin Vranken* 
This paper reflects on the uneasy relationship that exists in New Zealand between cot:nmon law and 
industrial/a"'· A parallel is d~al1'11 ·with the .n1ove of labour la»1 awaJ'f~ontthe general principles of the 
civil lalv in ~Continental Western Europe. Jt is argued that, .especially in the context of industrial action. 
the Labour Relations Act 1987 missed out on a u1.1ique chance to assert fully the social autonorny of 
Ntrn' Zealand labour lalv. 
Introduction 
The Governmenfs Gr.een Paper(NZ Governn1en~ 1985) on industrial relations states t.hat 
New Zealand legislation considerably restricts the freedom of strike and Jockout.1 Also. as the 
discussion docu·ment points out it is possible for a trade union that engages in some fonns of 
industrial action to find itself def~ending a com n1on law action for dan1ages or injunction 
(Green Paper. vol. 2. p. 274). HoVt' very real this latter possibility is has recently been tnade 
apparent. The extensive media coverage of such cases as Ford and T:ip Top2 has indeed serv·ed as 
a reminder that the legal regulation of industrial relations in this country is still subject to the 
common law as well as statutory law. 
The purpose of this short essay is to comment on the use of comn1on Ja¥l action \Vith respect 
to industrial action. It will be argued that, whil·e the usefulness ofstatutOJ)' restrictions on the 
freedom to strike can and has already been question·ed (e.g. Woods. 1979. p. 17ff~ ~Geare 1982). 
similar objections can be raised as regards the appropriateness of common law lim·itations on 
the freedon1 of industrial action. Furt.h·er and more fundamentally. it is sub111itted that the 
common law as such is inappropriate in dealing with industrial action in that it risks jeopar-
dising the very concept of the social autonomy of industrial law. The relationship between 
common law and industrial law in this repsect is an uneasy one and is con1parable to the (by 
and large) successful move of labour 'law away from the general principles of the civil law in 
Continental Western Europe. It is therefore to be regretted that the newly ·enacted Labour 
Relations Act 1987~ in transferringjurisdiction in certain com1non law actions and as related to 
• 
1 
2 
Lecturer. Industrial Relations Centr·c. Victoria University of Wellington. I v.'ould like to thank 
Professor Kevin Hince for the various discussions I have had with hin1 in the course of the 
preparation of this article. 
New Zealand Government ( 1985 )Industrial Relations: A FranJl'workfor Review. Wellington. Govem-
m·ent Printer (Vol 2. p. 275}. hereafter referred to as the Green Paper. 
On 23 March 1987. the High Court at Auckland ordered the Northern Storepersons and Packers 
Union to pay the Ford Motor Co damages of$L66 million in a case ari!Sing f~on1 a strike at the 
company's Wiri assembly plant last September. The union. apparently unaware that legal action 
had been taken. was not represented in Court and was subsequently succ·essful in its move to have 
the judgment set aside. The union was given 30 days to file a statement of defence (CP 1140/86. 
unreported). Meanwhile. however. Tip Top Ice Cream Co Ltd. is suing the Clerical Workers· Union 
for about $900 000 in damages over loss of profits and sales during a three-week strike last Novem-
ber. For a list of other pending damages claims arising out of work stoppages. see H Roth 
(1987). 
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industrial action fron1 the High Court to the Labour ~Court limits itself to a basically cosmetic 
change. 
Industrial action: statutory vis-a-vis common law restrictions 
Until recently. the rna in piece of legislation curbing industrial action was the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973. HO\\'ever. the practical usefulness oft he statutory restrictions it imposed on 
slrikes and lockouts has been questioned in the past (Woods '1979: Geare 1 982). The criticism 
has adequately been sun1rnarised in the Green Paper where it is pointed out that ""in a system 
designed to achieve industrial hannony through negoliated settlement of disputes. iron-rod 
enforcen1ent n1ay be consider·ed to be counter-productive .. (Green Paper. vol. 2. p. 276). Thus1 
even though a (relatively high) nun1ber of strikes and lockouts were illegal under previous 
industrial ·legislation. the statutory restrictions were seldon1 enforced. 
The ne\v Labour Relations Act ai·ms at introduc·ing legislation which is both relevant and 
(hopefully) useful by clarifying the distinction between lavlful and unlawful industrial action. 
The ne\v Act does so. for the first ti1ne ever. by explicitly stating that there is a right to strike or 
lockout regarding interc t disputes. While this statutory right. is not without restrictions3, the 
Labour Relations Act 1987 thus broadens the overall lawfulness of industrial action in relation 
to disputes of interest (s 233 Labour Relations Act). Also. the statutory penalties on strikes and 
lockouts are discontinued( "" 230(d) Labour Relations Act). Henceforth. the legal ren1edies for 
unla\vful industrial action are an order for compliance or. alternatively. an injunction and/or 
da1nages based on an existing (at common law) civil action in tort (s 230(e) Labour Relations 
Act). 
Statu.rory ren1edy: order for t..'Onlpliance 
The statutory ren1edy of an order for compliance ·is to be seen as a court order for con1pli-
ance ~'ith the Act or. n1ore in1portantly. with the collective instrun1ent that js binding on the 
litigating parties (Labour Relations Bill .. Explanatory Note, pp. VI and VII). As such, it is fully 
LOnsistent with the philo:sophy behind the new legislation. It is indeed believed that a basic 
lack offreedorn on behalfofthe collective par1ies to regulate their own relationship {and thus. 
to a .... u1ne rcsponsi bil ity for their ov.'n behaviour and actions) accounts. at least in part. for the 
current tnalfunctioningofthe industrial relations systen1. Thus it is assumed that a reduction 
ofgovernn1ent intervention 1nay be beneficial to the. overall functioning of the y ten1.4 Areas 
of reduced invo'lven1ent by the State include both the scope of collective bargaining (Labour 
Relations Act. part YH) and also. of direct releva nee for the purposes of this discussion. 
enforcen1ent and adrninistration of co11ective agreen1ents (Labour Relations Act. part 
VIII). 
Briefly. the collective parties are actively encouraged to et up their own n1achinery to 
govern their relationship during the currency oflhe collective inst.run1ent they have entered 
ir1to.5 The effectiveness of that tnachinery in allowing for the peaceful settlen1ent of potential 
dispute .. is the prirnary responsibility oft he parties thc;nlselves (s I R6( e) Labour Relations Act). 
It is only when one of the parties r,~ils to abide by the contractual rules it itself helped to 
establish. that outside assistance can be invoked through the application for a con1pliance 
order (s l86(f) Labour Relations Act: con1pare s 48 (2)(d) of the Industrial Relations Act 
197 3 ). 
3 The Jnain tatutory restriction undoubtedly i what can be referred to as the 60-days lin1it. Section 
233(l)(a) S'tipulatcs indeed that. if the strike or lockout relates to a n1aner that i the ~ubject of a 
dispute of interest created with intent to procure an award or agreen1ent in su hstitut ion lor an award 
or agrcen1ent l he date of expil)' oft he latter award or agreement n1ay be not n1ore than 60 days a l~tcr 
the date of the t:Olnnlcncemcnt of the strike or lockout. Moreover. an otherwise lawful ~trike or 
lockout shall be unlawful if the requir~n1cnts as to noti~e have not been cornp.licd with: 
s 234(3). 
4 About the use of nssurnptiuns in the Govcrnrncnfs Green Paper on industrial relations. seeM 
Vranken ( 1986). · 
5 I t~ the contracting partie ~ do not stipulate their own procedure for the peaceful ettlen1ent of( rights) 
d1 'pute . the clauses set out in the Sixth Schedule to the Act apply. The san1e is true if the contractual 
procedure is inconsistent with the tatutory procedure: 187 Labour Relations Act. 
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Conunon law rt.)stricrions: injunction and datnages 
The con1n1on law retnedies for industrial action ar~e usually based on an cconornic tort 
having been con1 n1itted. Econon1 ic torts are wrongful acts resulting in financial loss ~o another 
party. They arc not sin1ply li rnited to breach of statute. Under the new Labour Relattons ~ct (s 
242) the Labour Court is given exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the torts of consp•.racy~ 
intiJnidation. inducen1ent of breach of contract. and unlawful interferenc~e with trade. bus.tness 
or crnployn1ent. The jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Court for civil actior~ in relation to 
strikes and lockouts shal'l be exercised by a judge alone and section 296 relat1ng to urgency 
1. 6 app e. _ 
The 2 main remedies at con1n1on la\'l are an injunction and datnages. The Green Paper 
holds that (interlocutory) injunctions are the n1ost frequently sought cornn1on Ia\\' ren1edies 
because of the in1n1ediacy of industrial disputes. The usefulness of datnagcs. so it can be 
inCerred. is limited in that these apply only ex post: the primary concern of the other party (n1o t 
con1n1only the employer) is for the industrial disruption to be discontinued so as to ensure that 
no further suffering or dan1age 'Will follow. Hence, the general preference for injunctions over 
the dan1ages ren1edy appears to be self-evident. Also~ once an injunction has been issued. if it is 
subsequently not abided by. the defendant is likely to be held in conteanptofcourt(G~een Pape1: 
vol. 2. pp 274 ff). The jurisdiction of the Labour ~Court in relation to injunctions is specifically 
provided for 'in section 243 of the Act. 
HO\\'ever~ as the recent cases have arnply den1onstrated, dan1ages can be a n1ost powerful 
ren1edy too. Especially where the arnount av.rarded is substantiaL its deterrent effect as to future 
industrial action by either the an1e or different parties ought not to be underestin1at,ed. 
Moreover. \vhereas injunctions may only r,ender one particular industrial action ineffective. 
the darn ages retnedy potentially puts the union out ofbusiness ahogether. The seizure of union 
assets that n1ay subsequently follow an award of dan1ages, is likely to produce the very result 
labelled by Roth (in the context of union deregistration) as Hlegalised theft., ( 1986. p 21 ). And. of 
course. since datnages are usually awarded son1e ti ·me after the under:lyi ng dispute has con1e to 
an end~ its shock effect 1nay prove to be particularly unpleasant to say the least. The kno\vledge 
that the union's funds will get a boost due to the increased n1inin1un1 union n1en1bership 
requiren1ent in the Act (s 6(2) Labour Relations Act) is then but of little comfort to a union 
having to face 'legal action at C01nn1on law. 
~Current policies regarding the autonomy of industrial law 
The Governmenfs Green Paper. when considering the issue of legal restrictions on indus-
trial action, also addressed the question as to the appropriateness of con11non law ren1ed-
• 1es. 
Two possible alternatives to the curr,ent situation \\'ere identified. A first option \vould 
in1ply the complete r~emoval of co1n mon law actions from the industrial scene. The second one 
is less radical in that it would si:rnply involve putting restrictions on their use. The new Labour 
R,elations Act :indirectly identifies the latt~er option as being deen1ed the n1ost viable one. By 
lin1iting the nun1ber of instances of illegal strike action. comrnon law cases will arguably 
beco1ne tnore difficult to pursue. Also~ by transferringjurisdiction frorn the :High Court to the 
Labour Court. the likelihood ought to increase that the \Vider social aspects of industrial 
relations and~ more precise'ly.the special industrial dispute resolution procedures \\' ill be taken 
into account. 
It needs to be stressed., hO\\'ever~ as has already been indicated above. that the jurisdiction of 
the Labour Court in torts is to be exercised by a judge alone. No advantage can therefore be 
taken of the unique tripartite con1position oft he Court as it used to apply to industrial disputes 
in general.7 Also. the criteria for appoinhnent of judges to the Labour Court contain no explicit 
6 Section ~96 is new. h provides that. in 5 specifically enuJnerated circu n1stanccs. any party 10 the 
proccedtngs can apply to the Court to accord urgency to the hearing ofthose proceedings .. .t.\judge of 
the Labour Court shall then consider that application and rnay. ··if satbfi·ed that it is necessarv and 
just to do so··. order that the proceedings he heard by the Court ··as soon as practicable... ... 
7 Unlike the previous situation under the Industrial Relations Act 1973.the jurisdiction oft he Labour 
<;~u rt shall be exercised. _as a gen~ral rule. by a judge sitting alone. The only specific exceptions to 
thJs general rule. as provtded for 111 the Labour Relations Act 19H7. are dernarcation disputes and 
personal grievances. See s 295( 1) Labour Relations Act 
110 Martin Vranken 
reference to the requirernent. of any special skills or expertise in industrial relations nor even. 
rnore narrowly~ in industrial law (s 288 Labour Relations Act). Furthermore. it is to be noted 
that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court is limited to 4 specifically enumerated 
econotnic torts. There is nothing to prevent the High Court from developing its own (newly to 
be established) econotnic torts in relation to strikes and lockouts. Even though it has been held 
by Mulholland ( 1985) to be a debatable question as to whether Courts are nowadays still able to create 
new tortsb. any such newly established economic torts would unquestionably come within the 
jurisdiction of the High Court. And~ of course. the Labour Court is not given exclusive 
jurisdiction \Vith respect to n1ore general (non-economic) torts. all of which may also play a role 
in the overall context ofindu trial action. Wrong~ul acts such as envisaged by. for instance. the 
torts of negligence. trespa s or nuisance aH come within this category. Especially cruciat 
however. is that. \Vhenever the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in relation to torts (s 242) is 
invoked. the detern1inations by the Court n1ust be based on strictly legal principles only. As it is 
also the case with respect to injunctions (s 243) and applications for review (s 280), the 
jurisdiction or the ,Court to decide .. as in equity and good conscience it thinks fif. does not 
apply (s 279(4) Labour Relations Act). 
One is left to wonder \vhy what was identified as the first option .. namely the removal. as 
such .. of cotnn1on la\v rernedies fro111 the industrial scene. was disnl ,issed so readily. The Green 
Paper itself acknO\\'I,edges that a case can indeed be n1ade for granting complete in1munity to 
industrial action fron1 con11non la\v action. The justification given for its rejection is however 
that~ as econon1ic torts are ·· .. . relevant in contexts other than the industrial one. it is 
questionable as to whether actions carried out in the industrial sphere should be treated 
differently than if they ,,.,ere perforn1ed by any other individual or group~· (Green Paper, vol. 2, p 
277, no. 72). As ·it. will be argued belo\v. such justification is highly unsatisfactory in that it 
an1ounts to a direct negation of the social autonotny of industrial law. 
Ever since the enactn1ent of the first Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 1894. 
the legal regulation oflabour-n1anagement relations has increasingly proceeded in such a way 
as to recognise the deficiencies in applying strict principles of con1111on law. In fact the very 
principle of adopting spec·iallegislation to deal \Vith the relationship bet\veen the parties and 
the official designation of (registered) unions as the collective representatives of individual 
\VOrkers and en1ployers are by then1selves proof of the recognition that special prioriti~es and 
needs operate on the industrial scene. Hence. the role of the con1mon law has becon1e n1arginal 
over ti1ne (Szakat . 1981. p 12) both in the area of individual and collective labour law. A fairly 
recent illustration of thi acknowledged need for special techniques. procedures. principles 
and notions is the statutory concept of unjusti.fiable disn1issal as distinct frotn wrongful 
di missal at con1 n1on :law. The latest indication of this move towards autonomy is arguably 
provided by the title it elf of the ne\'l .legislation as being a '"Labour relations .. Act rather than 
an .. Industrial relations .. Act. The n1ore traditional tern1 of industrial relations. prevalent in 
Ne\\' Zealand. refers readily to such notions as industry or co.mrnerce and. thus~ it has econ-
otnic connotations. Labour relations, on the other hand~ is a terrn which is commonly used in 
Europe and has the particular advantage of stressing the presence of a uniquely social com-
ponent in the labour-managen1ent relationship. Thus it refers to an area of the law which is 
distinct frorn other branches oft he law regulating econon1ic activity. such as con1pany law or 
con11nercial la\\' but also the law of contracts and the law of torts. 
By explicitly confirn1ing that a co1nmon law cause of action (no rnatter how limited 'this 
n1ay be under the new Act) still exists, and, n1oreover. that con1n1on law proceedjngs can now 
be tarted in the Labour Court. the legislature appears to turn back the clock 100 years. 
The civil law experience 
The relationship between COJnn1on law and industrial/ labour law has undoubtedly always 
been an uneasy one. The New Zealand situation is by no n1eans unique in this respect. Even in 
the so-called civil law systen1s ofWestern Europe a con1parable (and likewise uneasy) relation-
ship between the principles of the civil code and specific labour legislation has persisted for 
n1any years and. at least in son1c instances. forexarnple Switzerland~ stiU continues. However. 
in Europe as \Veil. the general evolution has been one of gradual recogn·ition of the autonon1y of 
8 As the law of torts derives largely fron1 the con1n1on Ia\\'. there is no legislation that sets out a 
coxnplcte schedule of the acts which amount to torts. Yet. the various acts which constitute tort" 
appear to have bccorne fairly well-established over the years: R D Mulholland ( 1985). 
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lahour law by the legislature and, most importantly .. by the social partners then1selvcs. "1 h1s 
autonomy of labour law on the ("ontinent was the result of an ~evolutionary process, both in 
quantitative and qualitative tcrn1s. . . 
Quantitatively. the autonorny of labour law has been brought about by the ever 1ncrcastng 
atnount of special labour legishHion and nun1ber of collective agrcerncnts~ especially since 
World War II. Even n1ore noteworthy is the qualitative change that accon1panied the steadily 
growing body of labour law rules. As it has been argued by Blanpain. a leading European 
scholar in ('con1parative) labour law .. the cn1phasis in labour law is on solidarity rather than on 
individua1isrn. Hence~ il \\'Ould be wrong to interpret th,e ru'les of labour lav.' in t ~ern1s of 
contractual frecdon1 and (fictional) equality of the parties, both of which are so basic to civil 
law. lnst~ead. a proper interpretation oft he labour law rules n1ust take place in function of the 
1nodern values that forn1 the core of labour law. in casu job security and guaranteed incon1e 
(R1anpain. 19~3. pp. 42 ff). 
Briefly~ even though labour law in Europe initially tended to be viewed as part and parcel of 
the general civil law as it indeed gr,ew up under the aegis of individual contract law~ the plea for 
its autonon1y can be understood if seen as a reaction against the laissezfaire principles of the 
civil code. The practical result is that, even though civil law continues ·to have residual 
in1portance. its application in labour matters is to be rejected whenever it risks producing 
results which go against 'the v~ery ideas and principl,es labour law stands for. 
An illustration as to how the tension between civillav.' and labour .law can be (and indeed 
has been) resolved in favour of the autonomy of labour law is provided in the French Labour 
Code. In I=rance the right to strike is expressly guarant~eed by the Constitution. )'et. French 
unions can undeniably be held liable for losses arising fron1 industrial action ever since the 
Jaures case which dates fron1 the turn of the last c,entury.9 The general l ~ega :l basis for a civil 
action in tort is article 1382 of the Civil Code. As has been observed by Forde. although the 
question of civil liability for strike action was of little practical in1portance for :n1any years in 
France as \Veil. this is no longer the case. Recently. there has been an upsurge in lhc number of 
dan1age c.lain1s by French en1ployers (and by non-strikers) against strikers. union representa-
tives and trade unions alike (Forde. 1985). However. the en1ployer's ability to recover dan1ages 
is specifically lin1ited by Article L.411 - 12 of the Labour Code. Article L.411 - 12 stipulates 
that the real and personal property a union needs for its n1eetings. training progran1n1es and 
libraries cannot be se·ized. Thus, an employer's suit fordan1ages will not be allowed to Coree the 
union into bankruptcy (M Forde. p. 454). 
The limited tort liability offr,ench unions is son1ewhat con1parable to the current situation 
in Britain under the Employn1ent Act 1982. In Britain.lhe Thatcher A.dn1inistration ren1oved 
the imn1unity in tort 'traditionally enjoyed by unions. Hov.'ever. the I Q82 Act places lim its on 
the maxirnum amount of tort dan1age that can be awarded. The lin1its are related to the size of 
the men1bership of the union. the n1axin1un1 amount of dan1ages being £250 000 (i.e. sorne 
$750 000) in 'the case of a union with 100 000 or more .metnbers (En1ployn1ent Act 1982. s 
16). 
Conclusion 
As civil law on the Continent large'ly per:fonns the san1e functions as the con1n1on law in 
New Zealand .. and as collective repre entation of the \Vorkers is an1ong th~ central pillars or 
labour law in New Zealand as well as in Europe. any application of the con1n1on la\\' \\'hich 
would negate such a crucial principal is necessarily inappropriate. The aurnissibi 'li'ty of coin-
nlon law action in respect of industrial action risks upsetting this principle of collective 
r~epresentation. It is to be regretted that \\'hat once was announced as a n1ost :fundarnental 
revie\\' of industrial legislation in this country appears to have n1issed out on a unique chance 
to assert fully the social autonorny of Ne\\' Zealand labour Ia\\'. · 
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